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NORTH SEA ECONOMICS 
 
Research in North Sea Economics has been conducted in the Economics Department 
since 1973.  The present and likely future effects of oil and gas developments on the 
Scottish economy formed the subject of a long term study undertaken for the Scottish 
Office.  The final report of this study, The Economic Impact of North Sea Oil on 
Scotland, was published by HMSO in 1978.  In more recent years further work has 
been done on the impact of oil on local economies and on the barriers to entry and 
characteristics of the supply companies in the offshore oil industry. 
 
The second and longer lasting theme of research has been an analysis of licensing and 
fiscal regimes applied to petroleum exploitation.  Work in this field was initially 
financed by a major firm of accountants, by British Petroleum, and subsequently by 
the Shell Grants Committee.  Much of this work has involved analysis of fiscal 
systems in other oil producing countries including Australia, Canada, the United 
States, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria and Malaysia.  Because of the continuing interest in 
the UK fiscal system many papers have been produced on the effects of this regime. 
 
From 1985 to 1987 the Economic and Social Science Research Council financed 
research on the relationship between oil companies and Governments in the UK, 
Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands.  A main part of this work involved the 
construction of Monte Carlo simulation models which have been employed to 
measure the extents to which fiscal systems share in exploration and development 
risks. 
 
Over the last few years the research has examined the many evolving economic issues 
generally relating to petroleum investment and related fiscal and regulatory matters.  
Subjects researched include the economics of incremental investments in mature oil 
fields, economic aspects of the CRINE initiative, economics of gas developments and 
contracts in the new market situation, economic and tax aspects of tariffing, 
economics of infrastructure cost sharing, the effects of comparative petroleum fiscal 
systems on incentives to develop fields and undertake new exploration, the oil price 
responsiveness of the UK petroleum tax system, and the economics of 
decommissioning, mothballing and re-use of facilities.  This work has been financed 
by a group of oil companies and Scottish Enterprise, Energy.  The work on CO2 
Capture, EOR and storage was financed by a grant from the Natural Environmental 
Research Council (NERC) in the period 2005 – 2008.  
 
For 2016 the programme examines the following subjects: 
 
a. Decommissioning Tax Relief 
b. Further Research on Economics of EOR with Emphasis on Tax 
c. Collaborative Agreements among Licensees: Cluster Developments 
d. Collaborative Agreements among Licensees and Contractors 
e. Facilitation of Decommissioning Cost Reductions including by Collaboration 
f. Prospects for Activity in the UKCS to 2050 
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Maximising Economic Recovery from the UK Continental Shelf: 
A Response to the Draft DECC Consultation Strategy 
Professor Alex Kemp 
Aberdeen Centre for Research in Energy Economics and Finance (ACREEF) 
 
1. Introduction and Context 
The proposition that the central strategic objective towards the UK 
Continental Shelf should be to maximise economic recovery (MER) is 
clearly non-contentious.  Indeed it would be very odd if this were not the 
key objective.  It has been mentioned over many years in policy 
statements by DECC and its predecessor bodies.  However, the precise 
meaning of the phrase does require elucidation and elaboration.  The 
Consultation document emphasises the role of the Oil and Gas Authority 
(OGA), the regulator, in achieving MER in conjunction with the private 
sector companies who conduct all the operations in the UKCS.  There is 
thus the presumption that there are market failures in the present situation 
which prevents the achievement of MER.  Otherwise why should the 
OGA have a prominent role? 
 
From a national viewpoint economic investment and ongoing production 
can legitimately be defined as those which are viable in pre-tax terms.  
When these activities are undertaken by private sector companies the 
appropriate discount rate is then the cost of capital to the investor in 
question.  The Consultation document acknowledges this when it refers to 
a real pre-tax discount rate of 10% as being appropriate.  While the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) does vary across companies, 
reflecting differences in the extent to which their portfolio of assets is 
diversified, this discount rate is likely to be a reasonable average for the 
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industry.  It should be recognised however, that exploration companies 
will generally have a higher cost of capital than those with well-
diversified production assets. 
 
In assessing investments private sector investors will emphasise post-tax 
returns.  Thus the general aim of policy should be to ensure that projects 
which are acceptable on a pre-tax basis should remain commercially 
acceptable after tax.  Also, projects which are uneconomic before tax 
should not be rendered acceptable after tax.  These requirements are not 
easy to fulfil in practice, given the range of investment hurdles likely to 
be employed by different investors in the UKCS. 
 
The present investment environment incorporates serious capital 
rationing which in turn reflects very constrained net cash flows from 
existing operations and thus very limited internal funds to finance new 
investments.  Following the banking crisis and the oil price collapse debt 
finance from the banks is also very constrained.  Similarly, new equity 
finance is also heavily constrained as a result of the oil price collapse. 
 
In these circumstances potential new projects will be ranked by investors.  
The materiality of prospective returns will be important.  This is reflected 
in the size of the post-tax net present value (NPV).  The ratio of post-tax 
NPV/pre-tax investment, both at the WACC, is likely to be employed to 
rank new projects.  This measures the productivity of the capital invested 
and is the single most appropriate assessment criterion in the current 
circumstances of serious capital rationing.  To obtain MER it is necessary 
that policy-makers reflect this in the design of the taxation system.  While 
each company will have different thresholds a reasonable minimum 
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hurdle could be post-tax NPV@10%/pre-tax I ˃ 0.3.  A further discussion 
of detailed aspects of the tax system is given below. 
 
2. Scope of Regulation in Context of Market Failures 
The Consultation document highlights the need for investors to put MER 
at the heart of their investment decision-making process and also 
highlights the key role of OGA in determining how that may be achieved 
in particular circumstances.  This requires the presence of a range of 
skills and know-how on the part of OGA.  There is ample evidence that 
relevant multiple skills and knowledge have been acquired by OGA.  But 
no organisation can be omniscient with respect to the investment 
environment and project risks in the UKCS.  There will be ample scope 
for widely differing views on future oil and gas prices, for example.  But 
these play a key role in determining the economic viability of any 
proposed investments.  It is thus appropriate that, in general, licensees (or 
other owners of infrastructure) should not be compelled to undertake 
investments against their own commercial judgements. 
 
But the issue is not a black and white one and there are grey areas.  An 
example would be situations where there is downtime or production 
below a field’s capability due to apparent insufficient investment in repair 
and maintenance.  The issue of declines in production efficiency has 
received much attention in recent years.  The industry has been making 
substantial efforts to enhance production efficiency and in effect is 
accepting that performance in this area has been less than satisfactory.  
DECC already has provisions under the stewardship initiative to exhort 
operators to improve their performance with back-up sanctions also being 
available.   
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The involvement of OGA in this area of production efficiency is hardly 
contentions as the licensees as well as the nation should generally benefit 
substantially from increased production efficiency.  The decline in 
production efficiency over the past decade or so can be regarded as a type 
of market failure which effective regulation can rectify, at least in part.  
Private sector companies gain considerably from enhanced production 
efficiency, and in general, there should be no conflict of interest.  This 
would only arise if OGA requested investments where costs were 
disproportionate in relation to the benefits from enhanced productivity. 
 
But there are other areas where perceived market failures might not be 
resolved by regulation without requiring private sector companies to 
undertake investments which they might be reluctant to implement.  
Example situations include further investment in existing infrastructure 
facilities to facilitate the development of future new fields.  The 
investments could relate to projects such as oversizing of pipelines, life 
extension schemes on hub platforms, and provision of additional facilities 
on hub platforms for third-party use.  In the case of cluster developments 
involving several fields which have different licensees and where the 
fields are to be developed sequentially rather than simultaneously, there 
may be economies of scale in having a common infrastructure such as a 
pipeline or subsea manifold.  But there may be a reluctance on the part of 
the licensees in the first field development to finance an infrastructure 
which will accommodate fields which may not be developed for several 
more years.  In the current investment climate of low oil prices and 
serious capital rationing these features could well have a negative effect 
on investment attitudes. 
 
3. Resolving Possible Conflicts of Interest 
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The example cases described above relate to situation where there are 
potential economies of scale which in turn can enhance MER.  But they 
clearly require collaboration among licensees.  In a private sector 
investment environment each company will in general only invest in a 
project when its own interests are advanced.  Thus in situations where 
collaboration is required to bring a project to fruition there will need to be 
incentive mechanisms which make this possible.  The Consultation 
document recognises the problem and states that the OGA would not 
compel a licensee to invest in a project against its wishes.  But the 
document also adds that, where the OGA felt that, where a project was 
necessary to procure MER in circumstances where the licensee was 
reluctant to invest, then the OGA should have the power to require the 
licensee to divest his equity at fair market value.  Where the OGA also 
felt that another licensee could be willing to undertake the project 
investment the Consultation document indicated that this strengthened the 
case for divestment by the reluctant investor.   
 
It is arguable that, before compulsory divestment is seriously considered, 
further thought should be given to other regulatory measures which can 
achieve the desired objective in a less draconian manner.  With respect to 
the terms of access to infrastructure and any associated investment DECC 
already has powers to determine terms when requested by any of the 
relevant parties.  Recent legislation also permits DECC/OGA to be more 
proactive in this area.  Guidance already exists on the criteria which 
would be employed in making a determination.  It is arguable that these 
criteria should be considered afresh with a view to reassessing whether 
they are fully consistent with the objective of procuring MER.   
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This reconsideration should consider the investment hurdles likely to be 
employed by the companies involved and the associated costs and risks.  
The issues relating tariff terms to short-run/long-run marginal costs, 
short-run long-run average costs should be reconsidered.  The idea that 
tariffs should be uniform to different users of an asset, while equitable in 
an everyday sense, should also be reconsidered, given the possibility that 
non-uniform pricing could lead to an enhancement of economic 
recovery
1
. 
 
4. Infrastructure Ownership and MER 
There is evidence that a concentration of ownership of production and 
infrastructure assets in a particular geographic region can enhance 
economic recovery
2
.  An interesting recent development has been the 
acquisition of infrastructure assets by non-licensees in the UKCS.  Their 
sole business is to procure third-party business relating to transportation, 
processing, and other terminal facilities.  The fact that their revenues 
depend on securing further third-party business clearly differentiates them 
from licensees who are primarily interested in production activities.  
Thus, in this case it follows that divestment of infrastructure to non-
licensees could advance MER.  Policy should thus not disadvantage such 
divestment activities. 
 
Companies which are non-licensees are subject to the non-North Sea tax 
system which in essence currently means a headline rate of 20% (with 
further reductions promised), with 18% declining balance relief for plant 
                                                 
1
 For a discussion of the relationship between different tariff arrangements and MER see A.G. Kemp and E. 
Phimister, Economic Principles and Determination of Infrastructure Third Party Tariffs in the UK Continental 
Shelf (UKCS), North Sea Study Occasional Paper No. 116, University of Aberdeen Department of Economics, 
July 2010, pp. 26. http://www.abdn.ac.uk/research/acreef/ 
2
 See A.G. Kemp and T. Acheampong, E. Phimister, L. Stephen, The Economic Dependencies of Infrastructure 
Assets in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS), Aberdeen Centre for Research in Energy Economics and Finance 
(ACREEF), University of Aberdeen, SPE-175445-MS 
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and machinery.  This contrasts with a headline rate of 50% with 100% 
capital allowance on most fields.  When Supplementary Charge (SC) was 
introduced in 2002 and subsequently increased as a result of rising oil 
prices it was automatically applied to tariff incomes as well.  
Conceptually the case for this is this is dubious though it was 
administratively convenient.  Third-party transport and processing is 
arguably a separate business from oil and gas production.  Against the 
background of the prime need to achieve MER it is arguable that the SC 
should be removed from tariff incomes.  The directly associated costs 
would, of course, then not qualify for relief against SC.  It should be 
recalled that in 2003 PRT was removed from new third-party tariffing 
contracts.  The concession was given on the understanding that the 
benefits would be passed on in lower tariffs to users.  In current 
circumstances and in pursuit of MER there is a clear case for considering 
the removal of SC from tariff incomes.  This should be examined in the 
context of the recommended review of guidance on terms of third-party 
access and the pressing need to reduce costs across the UKCS. 
 
5. Encouraging Cluster Developments 
Much attention has been drawn to cluster developments, especially in the 
light of the cluster area tax allowance for SC.  This confers some 
advantages in post-tax terms to a cluster development compared to stand 
alone, individual field developments.  There can be economies of scale 
with communal facilities relating, for example, to pipelines, processing 
facilities or subsea manifolds.  These economies can be quite valuable
3
.  
There is thus merit in encouraging cluster developments.  But, when there 
are different licensees across the fields which comprise the cluster, 
                                                 
3
 See A.G. Kemp and L. Stephen, The Economics of Field Cluster Developments in the UKCS, North Sea Study 
Occasional Paper No. 77, University of Aberdeen Department of Economics, August 2000, pp. 59. 
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/research/acreef/ 
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difficulties can emerge in relation to priorities and development concepts.  
Perhaps the most difficult issue is where the field developments have to 
be sequential rather than simultaneous and the communal infrastructure 
has to be available at the time of the first field development.  All 
investors are expected to share the costs of the communal infrastructure.  
A licensee in a field where development for good reasons cannot take 
place for some years will not be enthusiastic about making capital cost 
contributions well in advance of the utilisation of that infrastructure.  In 
these circumstances trading of assets among the licensees in a cluster is 
one method to procure alignment of interests.  But there may be 
reluctance to trade in this way among the licensees.  In these 
circumstances another solution is to design a scheme whereby the equity 
holders in fields developed relatively late could obtain some 
compensation for contributing to the infrastructure costs which were a 
necessary element in the development of the early fields in the cluster.  
The present author and Linda Stephen undertook a detailed study of the 
many ways by which investment and operating costs of a common 
infrastructure could be shared among different licensees, including in 
circumstances where field developments were sequential
4
.  Various 
schemes are possible including discounts on contributions to the capital 
and operating costs of the infrastructure to late field developers, or 
compensation to them in financial form or even in barrels of oil.  Each 
has its advantages and complications, including the tax treatment of any 
compensation.  But the basic idea is worthy of examination by OGA as an 
alternative to a requirement to divest equity schemes when the licensee is 
reluctant to do so. 
 
                                                 
4
 See A.G. Kemp and L. Stephen, The Economics of Infrastructure Cost Sharing with Cluster Type 
Developments in the UKCS, North Sea Study Occasional Paper No. 53, University of Aberdeen Department of 
Economics, November 1995, pp. 98. http://www.abdn.ac.uk/research/acreef/  
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6. Encouraging Exploration 
The exploration effort as measured by the number of wells drilled has 
been at a very low level for a few years, and even when the oil price 
exceeded $100.  Thus the financing issue, which has clearly loomed very 
large after the oil price collapse, is by no means the only cause of the 
current low level of activity.  Over the last several years licence rounds 
have been held where very many blocks were put on offer.  A reasonable 
number have been taken up but the drilling commitments associated with 
the winning bids have been very low.  However, successive annual 
estimates of the remaining potential from the UKCS made by DECC have 
indicated substantial potential recoverable resources with best estimates 
being put in the 11 – 21 billion boe range.  But this says nothing about the 
likely sizes of fields which could be discovered.  This has been falling for 
a long time, though at a modest pace in recent years.  The average size 
has been around 20 mmboe, but, given the lognormal distribution of 
reserves, the most likely size is considerably less than 20 mmboe.  The 
exploration success rates using DECC’s definition of a significant 
discovery have been consistently high for a long time. 
 
In general there is no inhibition among investors in collaborating to form 
groups to bid for new licences.  But there is clear provision for 
competition at the bidding stage.  There are no cash bonus bidding 
schemes which might inhibit small companies with very limited 
exploration budgets.  The assessment criteria put great emphasis on the 
work programmes to be offered and the details for the marking scheme 
are admirably clear and transparent. 
 
There remain various explanations relating to the low level of exploration 
effort, including, low oil prices, the exploration and development costs, 
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the modest prospectivity in terms of size of expected discovery, and the 
taxation system.  It is also possible that, given the estimates of future 
aggregate potential noted above, there is some market failure.  Despite 
the existing substantial geological and geophysical knowledge further 
information could trigger more activity with enhanced success rates and 
less fruitless drilling.  The case for state intervention to procure and 
provide seismic data is essentially that this could bring national, external 
benefits.  In other words the exploration risks are reduced for the whole 
industry.  The success rate could increase and the failure rate should go 
down.  At a time of serious capital rationing risk reduction is particularly 
important.  It should be noted that the extra information cannot guarantee 
more drilling, but by reducing the risks, it is increasing the potential 
success rate.  The recent initiative by OGA to procure seismic data for the 
West of Shetlands region can be justified on the above grounds, 
particularly as, based on recent historical experience, the upside potential 
is substantial, despite the very high absolute costs. 
 
7. Tax Incentives for Exploration and Development 
The effects of reductions in exploration, appraisal, development, and 
operating costs, and some non-radical incentives on full cycle returns to 
new exploration have recently been examined by the present author and 
Linda Stephen
5
.  Key findings are that, with a mean price of $55, 
substantial cost reductions are necessary in order to make exploration 
viable before tax.  The study also examined the effects of the following 
tax incentives on investors in (a) an existing tax-paying position and (b) a 
project investor without current tax shelters: (1) the granting of eligibility 
of unsuccessful exploration costs for the investment allowance for 
                                                 
5
 See A.G. Kemp and L. Stephen, Prospective Returns to Exploration in the UKCS with Cost Reductions and 
Tax Incentives, North Sea Study Occasional Paper No. 134, University of Aberdeen Department of Economics, 
December 2015, pp. 81. http://www.abdn.ac.uk/research/acreef/  
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Supplementary Charge, (2) a refundable tax credit for exploration to be 
paid to an investor who has no other current income against which to set 
his allowances, (3) the ability to offset the investment allowance against 
income other than that to which the new investment relates, and (4) the 
award of interest (as for the Ring Fence Expenditure Supplement) when 
the investment allowance, though eligible to be activated, cannot in 
practice be used because the income available to the investor is 
insufficient to absorb the allowance.  The study found that, while all the 
incentives increase the full cycle returns to an explorer, the effect of each 
of the individual reliefs on these returns was quite modest.  For investors 
currently in a tax-paying position the most potent relief was found to be 
the ability to set the investment allowance against income other than that 
to which the allowance related.  For investors not currently in a tax-
paying positon the most potent relief was found to be interest on the 
investment allowance in circumstances where the allowance was 
available to be activated but the investor had insufficient income against 
which the allowance could be set.  A further general finding was that, in 
many cases, the available allowances could not be fully utilised because 
the explorer had insufficient income from a discovery to absorb them.  In 
all cases the full cycle returns for an ongoing tax-paying explorer 
exceeded those from a project investor.  For a project investor the effect 
of a refundable tax credit for exploration costs on the full cycle returns 
was found to be fairly modest.  There are so many other factors which 
determine full cycle returns.  However, where capital rationing is the key 
factor restricting the exploration effort the tax credit could have a 
worthwhile effect.  But the full cycle returns are held back by the income 
constraint from production which can mean that full relief for the other 
allowances are not received. 
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8. Wider Benefits of Improved Data 
The above discussion has highlighted the usefulness of the availability of 
seismic data in encouraging exploration and reducing unfruitful drilling.  
But enhanced data in other areas can also make positive contributions to 
MER.  Examples include fuller information on the likely timing of the 
cessation of production (COP) of fields.  This would not only help the 
contractors prepare for undertaking the work, but would also provide 
valuable information on any likely bunching of activities across several 
structures which could decommission at around the same time.  Spikes in 
this activity can cause undesirable shortages of particular expertise and 
cost increases.   Better information on COP dates can also reveal possible 
economies of scale in the decommissioning process.  For example, if in 
one geographic area more than one field is to be decommissioned at 
around the same time, there could be opportunities for economising on 
the use of heavy lift vessels. 
 
A considerable amount of activity in the UKCS is weather dependent.  
This applies to the installation of facilities, maintenance programmes, and 
decommissioning activities.  Bad weather can hold up these operations 
and add to the costs involved.  If better, more accurate weather 
information were available these costs could be considerably reduced.  In 
turn this requires further research and development work by the agencies 
involved in weather forecasting. 
 
9. Encouraging EOR 
To date only a modest amount of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) has taken 
place in the UKCS.  It is quite common in onshore situations in the USA 
and Canada, but in offshore situations the much higher costs make the 
projects economically more challenging.  Current low oil prices also 
13 
 
greatly contribute to the difficulties in achieving viability for EOR 
projects such as miscible gas injection, polymer flood, CO2 injection, and 
low water salinity injection.  Studies conducted by the present author and 
Linda Stephen
6
 confirm the difficulties in achieving a conventional 
hurdle rate of return on these investments.  The study highlighted a 
particular issue relating to the characteristics of some EOR projects and 
the current operation of the tax system.  Polymer flood, miscible gas, and 
CO2 EOR projects depend on very large amounts of injectants.  The costs 
of polymer and miscible gas are very substantial, as could the costs of 
CO2 depending on the CO2 price.  But injectant costs currently do not 
qualify for the investment allowance for SC.  The costs in question are 
arguably akin to a capital item and the study by Kemp and Stephen found 
that if they were eligible for the investment allowance the post-tax returns 
could be significantly enhanced.  There is thus a strong case for extending 
the definition of eligibility for the allowance to injectants required in 
tertiary recovery system. 
 
10. R and D 
It is clear that in present conditions in the UKCS further R and D and 
innovation are required to enhance productivity, including via cost 
reductions and by reducing the cycle time from first investment to first 
production.  The study by Kemp and Stephen on prospective returns to 
exploration
7
 found that reductions in the cycle time enhanced full cycle 
returns to exploration quite considerably.  R and D relating to the UKCS 
has been at modest levels for many years.  Private sector R and D, 
including by both oil companies and contractors, is currently incentivised 
                                                 
6
 See A.G. Kemp and L. Stephen, The Economics of EOR Schemes in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS), 
University of Aberdeen Department of Economics, SPE-175470-MS, June 2015, pp. 13. 
7
 See A.G. Kemp and L. Stephen, Prospective Returns to Exploration in the UKCS with Cost Reductions and 
Tax Incentives, North Sea Study Occasional Paper No. 134, University of Aberdeen Department of Economics, 
December 2015, pp. 81. http://www.abdn.ac.uk/research/acreef/  
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by tax credits, though there is evidence that the uptake varies 
considerably, sometimes because of lack of knowledge of the credit itself.  
State support for R and D relating to the oil sector has been muted for 
many years.  Now that there is acknowledgement within government that 
MER is a national objective the case for state support becomes stronger.  
The fruits of R and D financed by the state should become widely 
available in order to maximise the national benefits and thus make the 
greatest contribution to MER. 
 
To further incentivise R and D by licensees there is a case for adding 
contribution to R and D as a licence award criterion.  This has been the 
case in the past, but was discontinued in the 1990’s following the Single 
Market Act.  Care would be needed in the wording of the condition to 
avoid conflict with EU non-discrimination rules but this should be 
possible. 
 
11. Relationship between Collaboration and Competition 
The emphasis on collaboration raises the issue of potential conflict with 
competition law.  Historically competition among licensees in the UKCS 
has been encouraged and anti-competitive practices discouraged.  
Bidding for licences is an obvious area where competition has been 
encouraged.  The basis for collaboration to procure MER has now also 
been established, but there may be confusion among investors regarding 
which collaborative practices are consistent with competition laws and 
which are incompatible.  Given this uncertainty there is a case for the 
OGA and the Mergers and Competition Authority to provide guidance on 
the matter.  This could greatly speed up the process of reaching 
agreement among parties about the acceptability or otherwise of proposed 
collaborative arrangements. 
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12. Role of Supply Chain 
The Consultation document acknowledges rather briefly the role of the 
supply chain in contributing to MER.  But the supply chain undertakes a 
very high proportion of the activities relating to exploration, appraisal, 
field investment, production and decommissioning.  It is arguable that in 
the context of MER, including collaboration, cost reduction, R and D and 
innovation, more attention needs to be given to the role of the supply 
chain, perhaps particularly in the area of collaboration.  Such 
collaboration means (a) with operators and (b) with other members of the 
supply chain.  There may be many areas where further collaboration can 
produce major benefits.  Subject areas could include contractual 
relationships.  These can take several forms including (a) reimbursable 
day rate contracts, (b) lump sum contracts, and (c) risk-reward sharing 
contracts.  These could be reappraised within the context of the MER 
objective.  Contractors are also party to competition law and the 
relationship between (a) fostering collaboration and (b) remaining within 
competition law may well need clarification.  The OGA could play a 
useful role in facilitating such clarification. 
 
13. Encouraging M and A Activity 
It is generally recognised that the encouragement of M and A can 
contribute to MER.  There are already plenty examples of late field life 
transactions which have led to extra investment and further economic 
recovery.  An asset which is non-core to one company could become a 
core business to another company.  It is arguable that, where two parties 
wish to engage in an asset sale and purchase which promises to enhance 
MER, then no artificial blocks should be put on the proposed deal.  In the 
current environment, personified by low oil prices, a particular problem 
16 
 
has arisen relating to decommissioning tax relief.  Thus a company might 
be interested in purchasing a mature asset but, because of a combination 
of (a) low oil prices and thus very low tax payments on the income from 
the field, and (b) the current tax rules, the decommissioning relief 
available to the buyer is very low.  In effect he may not have access to all 
the relief which is available to the seller. This might stop an otherwise 
beneficial transaction.  The current rules do permit the seller to retain the 
decommissioning obligation and this has happened in several cases.  But 
the seller may well not wish to retain the decommissioning obligation.  It 
is a contingent liability and he will not know the condition of the asset 
which he will have to decommission.  There is thus a case for modifying 
the tax rules such that the buyer is not disadvantaged in terms of tax relief 
compared to the position of the seller. 
 
A more radical issue relating to asset transactions relates to the idea that 
platforms used as hubs for third-party use and subsequently being 
decommissioned could be taken over by contractor companies.  Some 
already have expertise in running platform operations as duty holders.  
They will also have expertise in undertaking the decommissioning work.  
It is arguable that the core expertise of licensees is in undertaking 
exploration and production operations rather than decommissioning 
platforms.  Currently there is, of course, a licensing obligation.  But the 
idea that contractor companies could take over responsibility for all the 
decommissioning obligations deserves further consideration. 
 
